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From the Editorial Board
Development ISSues is also available on the ISS website at www.iss.nl
Social Security in Africa 
This issue is devoted to the theme of providing Social Security in Africa. In most rich countries social security systems are today taken 
for granted. Although they differ in their generosity across countries, in most cases they provide a minimum of compensation in the 
event of illness, unemployment or retirement. In Africa, the implementation of these kinds of safety nets has just started and only in a 
few countries at that. Moreover they often only cover a small share of the total population in need.
The lack of insurance against daily risks such as illness, unemployment, natural disasters, crop failures and such like can have serious 
short term and long term consequences for the concerned households, in particular because alternative coping instruments such as 
credit or savings are also not available or are at least not accessible to the poor. Consider the case of a severe illness.  A household 
which has to finance the costs for treatment out of current income can be confronted with a transient period of poverty, whereby 
other expenditures such as for food, energy, children’s education or clothing have to be scaled back. Financing such costs through 
the depletion of assets can reduce future earning capacity or make the household more vulnerable to future shocks.  If the household 
decides to forgo treatment altogether, the health status will decline and probably also adversely affect earning capacity. 
The implementation of social security is particularly difficult in Africa, because most of the countries in that region face serious budget 
constraints, making it almost impossible to finance often rather expensive insurances systems. In addition, the implementation and 
management of social security systems requires quite complex institutions which, again, are not available in most of these countries. 
Therefore it is important to explore how both problems can be tackled and to think about alternatives which could be used in the 
meantime.
This issue considers these questions and draws on experiences which can help to find answers. Arne Tostensen explores alternative 
social security systems adapted to the African context.  Guy Carrin and colleagues consider in particular the case of social health 
insurance and reflect on various recent experiences in Africa. Michael Grimm summarizes a discussion on health insurance systems 
targeted at the poor which was held at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics in 2008. Wendy Janssens and 
co-authors share their experience with the implementation of a pilot program introducing the concept of low-cost private voluntary 
health insurance products in Namibia. Finally, Mahmood Messkoub discusses possibilities to provide old-age security to the ageing 
African population. We hope these papers make a useful contribution to the burning questions and provide a signal to policy makers 
and practitioners that insurance against daily risks should be a central element in any poverty alleviation strategy.
Michael Grimm, Guest-editor
Considering the major upheavals taking place in the global economy right now, we couldn’t 
bring out DevISSues without paying some attention to it. This issue therefore includes two 
shorter articles which consider the economic crisis from different angles. The first is by the 
Rector of ISS, Louk de la Rive Box, who considers what the crisis means for civil action and 
the second is by Karel Jansen who wonders what effect the crisis will have on the West’s 
relationship with developing countries.
As we approach the end of the academic year for our Masters participants, we have to say 
thank you and good bye to the two student reps on the editorial board; Karoline Kemp and 
Achmad Uzair. Both have been active members of the board and have spent much of their 
precious spare time working on DevISSues. We wish you both the best of luck in the future. 
We also welcome the new representatives; Chantelle de Nobrega and Nick Glockl from the 
2008-2009 batch.
Another good bye is to Thomas Tichar, editor of DevISSues until May of this year. Thank you 
for all your hard work and good luck with your future projects. His role has been taken over by 
Jane Pocock who took up the position of editor of DevISSues in September this year. 
Gertrude from Kyanja parish-Nakawa 
Division in Uganda is 78 years old, 
blind and has lost all her children to 
AIDS. Her husband died 10 years ago. 
She was looking after four orphaned 
grandchildren but they left once she 
was unable to continue caring for them. 
Gertrude spends her day sitting in front 
of her shack begging passers-by for 
money and food. She was recently given 
some clothes from a new church near 
her home but receives no other State or 
NGO aid. The story of Gertrude brings 
home the difficulties faced by many poor, 
elderly people in Africa who have no 
family to turn to and no social security 
system to help them meet even their 
most basic needs.
With thanks to Ddungu Racheal Mugabi 
for use of the photo.
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Feasible social security  
systems in Africa
Dr Arne Tostensen
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
Increasing attention is being devoted to social security in developing countries as part of their poverty reduction strategies. This 
note discusses social security arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa to mitigate the unexpected adversity facing the masses of 
poor people. It is argued that for a social security system to be feasible in circumstances of severe budget constraints, formal and 
informal mechanisms must be combined.
Apart from deprivation in terms of 
income and consumption, a defining 
criterion of poverty is vulnerability 
to shocks and contingencies. These 
include natural and ecological calamities 
(droughts, floods, earthquakes, 
epidemics, pests, etc.) and human-made 
disasters and adversity of economic, 
social or political nature (wars, civil strife, 
market collapse, loss of income earners, 
etc.). To withstand economic shocks 
and crises, households must be able to 
survive such periods without irreversible 
damage to the productive capacity of 
their members and to their net asset 
position. In other words, vulnerability 
is not only related to coping with the 
sudden and temporary loss of income, 
but equally much to the wherewithal to 
recover after the shocks and to restore 
livelihoods to the pre-shock level. Social 
security arrangements are intended to 
assist poor households to overcome 
such temporary adversity.
The normaTive foundaTion
The right to social security was 
enshrined in Article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. ILO 
Convention no. 102 of 1952 specifies 
further a series of minimum standards. 
These rights were subsequently 
reconfirmed in Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights from 1966 
which recognises “the right of everyone 
to social security, including social 
insurance”.
The actual fulfilment of these 
obligations varies widely across the 
globe. In most industrialised countries 
elaborate welfare states have been 
established which afford the citizens 
generous social protection. However, 
in this regard the predicament of sub-
Saharan Africa is particularly egregious. 
With reference to developing countries, 
the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights recognises in its 
authoritative General Comment no. 6 
that the full implementation of Article 
9 can only be done “within the limits 
of available resources” which, in turn, 
means only the “progressive realisation” 
of this right over time. In other words, 
the Covenant concedes that the 
obligations of the signatories as the 
duty-bearers are not expected to be 
met immediately; the process seems 
open-ended. 
WhaT is social securiTy?
The International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) defines social security as:
… [t]he protection which society 
provides for its members, through 
a series of public measures, against 
the economic and social distress that 
otherwise would be caused by the 
stoppage or substantial reduction 
of earnings resulting from sickness, 
maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, invalidity, old age 
and death; the provision of medical 
care; and the provision of subsidies for 
families with children.
However, this conventional definition 
is deficient in two respects. First, it 
places undue emphasis on the role of 
the state on social security provision. 
Second, it presumes that the majority 
of the citizens have already attained 
a satisfactory living standard in a 
modern economy, which social security 
is designed to protect. The referent 
is obviously Western societies which 
hardly fits the contemporary African 
situation.
A more appropriate definition would 
embrace all forms of social security in 
varying configurations of traditional, 
informal and formalised modern forms. 
In other words, social security would 
encompass the sum of all regulations 
within a society which aim to guarantee 
the individual or the group not only 
physical survival, but also general 
protection against unforeseeable risks 
which would entail the deterioration 
of their situation, the consequences of 
which cannot be borne by the individual 
or group without external assistance. 
Most African economies are agrarian, 
with the majority of their populations 
deriving an income as self-employed 
smallholders. The small size of their 
plots and the vagaries of the weather as 
well as an array of other contingencies 
make them very vulnerable to economic 
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shocks. Since most social security 
arrangements cater only for the formal 
economy this means that, in terms of 
coverage, the overwhelming majority of 
Africans remain unprotected by formal 
means against the main risks. 
In these circumstances, from what 
sources do Africans actually derive 
social security? Large segments of 
African populations do not enjoy social 
security at all; they are at the mercy 
of nature and human forces beyond 
their control. Traditionally, however, the 
collective solidarity of the extended 
family, clan and ethnic group was the 
mainstay of income and social security. 
These collective, community-based 
social security arrangements are based 
on systems of mutual dependence 
or reciprocity. But this stylised 
representation of traditional society is 
fast disappearing.
Four broad types of institution have 
evolved to provide social security in the 
African context: the state; the private 
market; civil society; and the family. 
From an institutional perspective the 
principal difference between these 
sources of social security is found in 
their underlying incentive structure of 
co-operation and compliance. The state 
relies on legislation and compulsion, 
whereas the market depends on 
economic incentives. By contrast, civil 
society social security arrangements 
are predicated on mutual interest and 
peer pressure, while the family provides 
cohesion based on deep-seated social 
norms and values.
differenT social securiTy 
insTiTuTions
Social security provision in developing 
countries has evolved by default rather 
than by design. Since developing 
countries still find themselves in a 
transitional phase, traditional forms of 
social security co-exist with modern 
ones, supplemented by ‘in-between’ 
variants of an informal nature.
State-based systems
State-based social security systems are 
modelled on European experiences 
and cater for people in the modern 
sector of the economy, i.e. only for 
those in organised public and private 
employment. For example, social 
insurance pension schemes and 
provident funds typically cover only 5–10 
percent of the total labour force plus 
their dependants. 
A distinction is normally made between 
social assistance and social insurance. 
The former is defined as benefits in 
cash or in kind financed by the state (at 
central or local level), as a rule provided 
on the basis of means-testing. Typical 
examples are so-called safety nets for 
poor people in need. The concept also 
includes universal benefit schemes 
which are not means-tested, e.g. child 
and family support. Social assistance is 
non-contributory, i.e. the beneficiaries 
do not contribute in advance of drawing 
benefits. It is funded from general tax 
revenue. 
By contrast, social insurance as a 
form of social security is financed by 
contributions and is based on the 
insurance principle, which means the 
elimination of uncertainty associated 
with loss for the individual or the 
household. This is achieved by pooling 
the contributions of a large number 
of similarly risk-exposed individuals or 
households into a common fund that 
compensates the loss experienced by 
any member. In other words, resource-
pooling and risk-sharing are defining 
characteristics of social insurance 
schemes which by nature are collective. 
As such they contain an element 
of redistribution. But they may be 
administered either publicly by the state 
or privately by insurance companies. 
Social insurance schemes may be 
compulsory or voluntary.
One of the main social protection 
problems in Africa is coverage. The 
economic conditions are such that the 
prospects are bad for the introduction 
of tax-based social assistance schemes. 
The number of poor is simply too 
large and the tax base too narrow. 
Contributory health insurance schemes 
suffer from similar problems, mainly 
because of the unpredictability of 
benefits and the adverse selection 
problem. The prospects are somewhat 
better with respect to contributory 
pension schemes. A convincing case 
can be made for the judicious extension 
Only workers in formal employment are covered by official social security schemes. Jean Christophe Goussand
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of coverage in order to improve the 
financial base. More contributors 
mean greater revenue immediately 
while the payable benefits may be 
deferred into the future. However, the 
governance and management of public 
social security institutions are the main 
hurdles. There are deficiencies in record 
keeping and the processing of benefit 
claims.
Market-based systems
Complementary market-based social 
security schemes run by private 
insurance companies on a commercial 
basis have emerged alongside state-
based systems, even though they 
still play a marginal role in the total 
provision of social security. While the 
efficiency and quality of commercial 
social insurance systems are recognised, 
their inaccessibility for the low-income 
strata renders them suitable instruments 
mainly for the affluent, urban-based 
parts of the population. Pressures to 
privatise social security have not really 
taken hold in Africa. Statist traditions are 
resilient and social security is considered 
such an essential service that the state 
prefers to retain it under its umbrella. 
Membership-based systems in civil 
society
An array of membership-based schemes 
has emerged in civil society. They fill a 
gap left by the state and the market. 
The distinguishing criteria of these 
schemes are their internal homogeneity 
and limited size. Those who form such 
groups have something in common that 
bind them together in mutual interest: 
kinship or ethnicity; geographical origin, 
or friendship. And they are small enough 
to be manageable. These mutual-help 
societies take a multitude of forms. 
All over Africa, the best known are 
perhaps the informal rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAs). The 
basic principle is the same everywhere: 
a fixed sum is paid periodically into a 
common pool by each member. From 
this pool each member may withdraw 
at fixed intervals a lump sum equal to 
his/her own contribution multiplied 
by the number of members. Thus, 
each member has rotating access to 
a continuously replenished pool of 
capital. The pool may run for a short 
while, only a few months, or extend over 
several years; it may involve small sums 
of money or considerable amounts; the 
members may be few or many; it may 
comprise a mixture of members, only 
women, only men, urban dwellers or 
rural peasants. The variants are legion 
but the basic principle remains the 
same. Most ROSCAs are perhaps not 
primarily social security institutions. As 
a rule, the withdrawn money may be 
used for any purpose. Some members 
use it for investment, others for pure 
consumption items, and still others to 
withstand hardship in social security 
contingencies (illness, accident, death, 
unemployment, etc.). As such they 
constitute an important informal social 
security mechanism, which enables poor 
people to deal with contingencies.
A second, slightly more formalised 
type of social security arrangement is 
organised along co-operative lines. 
Savings and credit co-operatives 
(SACCOs) are often linked to the 
workplace. Small deductions are made 
regularly from the wage, and after a 
stipulated period the contributor is 
allowed to withdraw, say, three times 
his/her contribution. Repayment is also 
through a wage deduction. Again, there 
is generally no restriction on the use of 
the loan and many borrowers use the 
money to meet contingencies. 
At present, social security arrangements 
hardly exist for the great majority of self-
employed peasants in the rural areas. 
There is some scope, however, for crop-
based schemes. To finance basic social 
protection, levies could be imposed on 
cash crops delivered to co-operatives 
or other marketing organisations. 
The design of such schemes could 
be negotiated by the peasants in 
conjunction with the officers of their 
organisations, probably with technical 
assistance inputs from outside.
More or less formalised NGOs also 
perform social security functions but 
they appear to be less important than 
ROSCAs and SACCOs. Be that as 
it may, there seems to be scope for 
strengthening the role of NGOs in social 
security provision. Trade unions are 
particularly well placed in that regard, 
but their disadvantage from the point 
of view of coverage is that they are 
confined to the formal sector of the 
economy.
All the above civil society forms of social 
security have an untapped potential, 
and with concerted efforts their relative 
importance could grow. Some would 
argue that the state should leave them 
alone lest they become ‘contaminated’ 
and acquire the same problems that 
have beset the state-based schemes. 
On the other hand, judicious, 
unobtrusive technical assistance might 
be in order to improve management 
and enhance efficiency.
Kinship-based systems
Finally, the support system of the 
extended family is still alive in Africa, 
albeit under increasing pressure. First, 
the productive resources an average 
household commands are diminishing, 
mainly due to the sub-division of 
land from one generation to another. 
Second, household expenditures are 
soaring with respect to education, 
health and other services. Third, the 
dependency ratio is increasing due 
to unemployment, high fertility rates, 
children orphaned by AIDS, and 
the destitution of relatives. All this 
constrains the ability of households to 
contribute to informal social security 
networks, simply because there is 
little to spare. Social security systems 
are sensitive to such demographic 
parameters: fertility, mortality and 
population growth rates, as well as age 
structure and the impact of the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic.
conclusion
The prospects for feasible social 
security systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
do not appear encouraging. In the 
circumstances, the only practicable 
way forward is to combine the four 
main tiers of social security, and 
devise a new division of responsibility 
between public and private provision. 
At any rate, whatever new ‘blends’ 
may emerge they must be closely 
tailored to the needs and conditions 
of each country. Judicious expansion 
of state- and market-based schemes 
is no doubt feasible, with emphasis 
on contributory arrangements. The 
problems of collection, administration, 
investment and general governance are 
tough but not insurmountable. The real 
challenge, however, lies in expanding 
the membership-based arrangements 
of civil society, including crop-based 
schemes to capture the vast majority of 
smallholders who generally fall outside 
existing systems.
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a dual challenge: improved 
access To beTTer healTh care 
In most economically advanced 
countries, adequate social security 
laws are basically taken for granted. 
However, it often took many decades for 
social security systems to benefit all or 
major parts of the population in those 
countries. In the area of social health 
protection, for example, it took Japan 
36 years to move from the enactment 
of the first health insurance law to 
the final law establishing nation-wide 
social health insurance. In the United 
Kingdom, a similar time period was 
needed to achieve its universal tax-
based system.    
A key question now is whether African 
countries can take shorter routes to 
universal health coverage, rather than 
going through a lengthy transition 
period. Universal health coverage 
means that all of the population has 
access to appropriate health care 
when needed and at an affordable 
cost. Leapfrogging will be far from 
easy, as many African countries face 
the dual challenge of enhancing their 
overall health expenditure level and 
of drastically improving access to and 
quality of health care.  First, noting that 
a basic set of health services would cost 
at least $ 34 per capita,  many of the 
46 WHO member states in the African 
region fall short of this objective. In 
2005, 29 countries spent less than this 
amount. Secondly, problems of access 
to health care are pervasive and are 
linked to the level of households’ out-
of-pocket payments for health care: 
high out-of-pocket payments deter 
people from seeking care. In Kenya 
for example, out-of-pocket payments 
represented about 50% of total health 
expenditure in 2003.  The results from 
a Kenyan household survey in the same 
year showed that 24.9 % and 24.7% 
of patients did not use outpatient 
(ambulant) and inpatient (hospitalized) 
care, respectively, although they needed 
it. About 40% of these patients reported 
they could not afford the out-of-pocket 
payments charged for these categories 
of care.  
The poTenTial role of social 
healTh insurance
The challenge is: how to achieve both 
a higher level of expenditure and a 
lower level of out-of-pocket payments? 
There has been the call by African 
heads of state to allocate at least 15% 
of annual government budgets to the 
health sector, referred to as the Abuja 
Declaration.  In addition, if the existing 
international commitments are fulfilled 
it is expected that this financial support 
would indeed increase substantially 
over the next decade.   Both enhanced 
domestic and external funding for 
health would boost health systems, 
not only in terms of improved quality 
of health care, but would also shift 
away from out-of-pocket payments to 
‘prepayment of health care’. Health 
financing via prepayment implies that 
people are not deterred from seeking 
care and at the same time are protected 
against the financial risks of falling 
ill, as the burden of patients to pay 
out-of-pocket will be eliminated or 
substantially reduced. 
There are a number of alternative ways 
to achieve universal health coverage via 
prepayment. When governments are 
the only responsible financing agents 
for the transition to universal health 
coverage, one usually speaks of a 
tax-based health care system. Another 
mechanism is social health insurance 
(SHI), which in its mature form involves 
compulsory membership among all of 
the population. Principal funding is via 
earmarked contributions by employees 
and their employers, civil servants and 
government (as their employer), and 
the self-employed from the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy. The 
base for the contributions of employees, 
civil servants and employers is usually 
the employees’ or civil servants’ salary. 
The contributions of the self-employed 
are often either flat-rate or based on 
estimated income. However, hybrid 
forms of SHI are also quite prevalent, 
with government paying contributions 
for those, such as the unemployed and 
the poor, who would otherwise have 
difficulties in contributing, Another 
important characteristic is that health 
care provision financed by SHI is often 
mixed, based on both the public and 
private health care sector. Furthermore, 
for its management functions (such 
as member registration, collection of 
contributions, contracting with and 
reimbursement of providers), SHI may 
also be organized by parastatal or non-
profit organisations such as sickness 
funds.  
africa’s recenT inTeresT in 
social healTh insurance
SHI is not a widely adopted health 
financing mechanism in Africa. 
While there are many countries that 
Social health insurance: how feasible is its 
expansion in the African region?
by
Guy Carrin




















operate a health insurance scheme 
for civil servants and/or private sector 
employees only some of these include 
features of a SHI, its appeal to cover 
larger parts of the population has been 
growing. Countries including Ghana, 
Nigeria and Rwanda have passed SHI 
laws. Earlier on, Kenya investigated 
the feasibility of SHI and Lesotho and 
Swaziland are doing so now. What could 
explain its attractiveness? One distinct 
feature is that it does not call exclusively 
on public finance, but instead spreads 
the responsibility of health care 
financing among households and the 
private sector as well. From that point 
of view, tax-based systems in Africa are 
particularly challenged: the overall tax 
base may need to be strengthened, tax 
compliance may require improvement, 
and then a sufficient allocation towards 
health would have to be called for. Still, 
social health insurance is not a panacea 
either. It requires that an important 
organizational apparatus be put in 
place and that many actors in society 
shoulder critical responsibilities, such as 
the willingness and ability to contribute 
to the SHI scheme and then to comply 
with its regulations, thereby accepting a 
certain degree of financial solidarity. 
feasibiliTy analyses of social 
healTh insurance
Since 2002, the WHO has been involved 
in technical advisory work especially on 
assessing the feasibility of SHI in Kenya, 
Lesotho and Swaziland in collaboration 
with national experts from those 
countries. In each country we analysed 
the financial, organizational and political 
feasibility. Below we present some of 
the highlights of this work that should 
help us in formulating general guidance. 
In Kenya, one basic financial scenario  
was that of gradual implementation of 
universal health coverage: coverage 
by a possible National Social Health 
Insurance Fund (NSHIF) would reach 
62% of the population after 10 years, 
with further expansion in the second 
decade of SHI implementation. An 
important feature is that such a scenario 
would only be conceivable with sizable 
government subsidies. Without such 
subsidies, access to health care among 
low-income households would be 
jeopardized, as the contributions from 
formal sector employees and civil 
servants would be insufficient to cross-
subsidize the needed health care of the 
poor. External donors’ financial support, 
however, could alleviate this extra 
financial burden on government. In fact, 
a variant of the basic scenario assumes 
that external donors would finance the 
provision of antiretroviral therapy, which 
would reduce the required government 
subsidies by about 20%. 
As far as the organizational aspects are 
concerned, it was studied whether the 
existing National Hospital Insurance 
Fund, a mandatory hospital insurance 
scheme for the formal sector with a 
small part of voluntary insurance for 
informal sector workers, might be 
transformed into the NSHIF. The latter 
would then be governed by a Board of 
Trustees with representatives from civil 
society. It is also interesting to note that 
the proposed NSHIF would include a 
Department of Fraud and Investigation 
in order to check the fund’s financial 
activities.  Civil society groups and 
enterprises such as the Post Office 
would also be given a role, especially 
in the collection of contributions from 
households in the informal sector. 
Concerning its political feasibility, 
consultations were held with a great 
number of stakeholders and interest 
groups, and most were supportive 
of the proposed NSHIF. Only 
Kenya’s private Health Maintenance 
Organizations were very critical and 
had doubts about NSHIF feasibility. 
Finally, in 2004, the Kenyan Parliament 
passed a law on the NSHIF. However, 
President Kibaki judged it still needed 
amendments and returned it to 
Parliament for further debate that is still 
ongoing. Nonetheless, with a long-term 
vision, the existing National Hospital 
Insurance Fund is undertaking a number 
of institutional changes to increase 
membership and extend benefits so as 
to be better prepared should SHI take 
off. 
Lesotho’s  priority concerns are to 
improve the quality of and access to 
health services, especially to the poorer 
half of the population. To this end, the 
country wants to raise the amount of 
money it can spend on health through 
SHI and decrease user charges to 
reduce out-of-pocket expenditure. Of 
the several financial scenarios discussed, 
stakeholders found the one that aims to 
extend SHI coverage across the whole 
population most attractive. This scenario 
envisions a rapid implementation of 
SHI for the formally employed, while 
gradually extending this to the rest 
of the population over the course of 
a decade. Almost half the population 
would be exempt from having to pay 
owing to poverty. Current spending 
on health from tax sources would be 
maintained and supplemented with 
SHI funding. The combined funding 
would allow a substantial investment in 
improved quality health services.
As coverage increases and more poor 
people join, the financial balance of 
the SHI would tip towards deficit after 
some seven years. This would require 
subsidies and/or a raise in contribution 
rates for the formal sector.
Lesotho’s stakeholders, including 
the government and civil society, are 
debating whether or not to go ahead 
with such a system. The implication that 
needs to be accepted first is that a SHI 
would institutionalize a cross-subsidy 
from rich to poor. Today, those who can 
afford it usually purchase health services 
in neighbouring South Africa, but a SHI 
would only allow a select number of 
medically essential referrals. Services 
over and above what the Lesotho SHI 
system is scheduled to offer would still 
need to be paid for privately. Everyone 
would, however, be contributing to the 
SHI, so that the cost of providing and 
improving services would be spread 
between households, enterprises and 
government. How exactly the money 
would be best spent to achieve these 
goals would be the next question to 
tackle.
Similarly in Swaziland, given the 
concern about the poor quality of 
care in the government sector, the 
feasibility assessment of a SHI served 
to provide alternative options to the 
existing private medical aid scheme 
now under discussion for civil servants 
(a private health insurance scheme). 
Another challenge of the current health 
financing system is the high expenditure 
on and the insufficient organization of 
medical referrals to South Africa. Thus, 
the Ministry of Health’s objective of 
introducing SHI is to ensure universal 
access to health care by mobilizing 
additional resources to finance quality 
improvements, particularly in the public 
sector, as well as to build up tertiary, 
specialized care within Swaziland.
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With a small population of about 
one million, the key stakeholders 
preferred a scenario in which gradually 
all population groups would join 
the SHI scheme to achieve universal 
access after six years. About a fourth 
of the population would be exempted 
due to reasons of inability to pay 
contributions. A key assumption for 
this health financing system is that the 
government’s budget for health care 
would be maintained and increase in 
line with GDP growth. The SHI scheme 
would then mobilize approximately 
another 50% of the government’s 
budget for health. With these 
additional resources, significant quality 
improvements and increased utilization 
by the population could be financed.
The key challenge now being debated 
is implementation feasibility: can quality 
of health care at government facilities 
be improved within a few years to 
such a level that the population finds 
it acceptable to make contributions of 
around 6 to 7% of salaries? Another 
political challenge is that many 
representatives of the stakeholders and 
negotiating parties, as part of the upper 
middle class, have a strong interest in 
receiving access to the private health 
sector, with universal health coverage 
and solidarity appearing to follow as 
secondary objectives. It is now upon 
the government to take a decision, 
which also strongly depends on which 
financing scheme - a private health 
insurance or a SHI - the civil servant 
unions prefer. 
implemenTing social healTh 
insurance policies:  The case of 
rWanda 
Aiming at universal health coverage  
for its 9.5  million population, Rwanda 
has spearheaded the development 
of a number of schemes that 
together constitute its SHI system. 
The three most important ones are 
the Rwandaise d’assurance maladie 
(RAMA), the Medical Military Insurance 
(MMI) and the Assurances Maladies 
Communautaires (AMCs). The RAMA 
social health insurance is compulsory for 
government employees and voluntary 
for private sector employees. Its 
contribution rate is 15% of basic salary 
(shared equally between employee 
and employer). MMI covers all military 
personnel, who pay a contribution rate 
of 22.5% of basic salary (5% paid by 
employee and 17.5% by government). 
AMCs are community-based health 
insurance schemes whose members 
are mainly rural dwellers and informal 
sector workers in both rural and urban 
areas. They make up the majority of the 
population; by the end of 2007 about 
5.7 million Rwandans were covered by 
AMCs. Members usually contribute 
1000 Rwandan Francs (1.85 US$) per 
person per year which is matched by 
the government (with external donor 
support). 
An important innovation has been 
the launch and extension of the AMC. 
Despite its voluntary character, the 
AMCs have benefited from a steady 
increase in membership. One of 
the principal factors of this success 
has been the collaboration among 
all stakeholders, and especially the 
financial support from government and 
external donors. Still, the AMCs face 
many challenges including making 
contributions more affordable to 
the poorest and improving financial 
management capabilities. 
In general, there is the challenge to 
further reduce the fragmentation in 
this SHI system, but overall progress 
is steady. Rwanda has developed a 
legal framework for governing social 
health insurance and continues with 
its expansion. In particular, a recent 
law (April 2008) stipulates the future 
requirement of compulsory health 
insurance for every Rwandan.
The results of Rwanda’s efforts in 
building up a SHI system can also be 
seen from the improvement in several 
health financing indicators, which 
include a greater availability of financial 
resources for health (34$ per capita 
in 2007 vs. 13$ in 1999), an increased 
coverage of the rural and informal 
sector population by the AMCs (from 
1.2% in 1999 to 75.6% in 2007), and a 
lower burden of out-of-pocket payments 
(from 24.7% of total health expenditure 
in 2000 to 15.9% in 2005).
WhiTher social healTh 
insurance in The african 
region?
The feasibility studies summarized 
above indicate that there is a certain 
potential for social health insurance in 
the respective countries. This reflection 
is reinforced by the positive outcomes 
from the social health insurance policies 
in Rwanda. However, we can not 
merely generalize this assessment to 
the African region as a whole. Indeed 
a number of conditions for adequate 
implementation of SHI need to be 
satisfied. The prerequisites for success 
are vital and should once more be 
emphasized. First, financially speaking, 
with contributions from all stakeholders, 
sometimes including external donors, 
SHI can indeed be a vehicle for universal 
health coverage. The assumption 
here, however, is that countries’ overall 
income level and income growth 
are sufficient, enabling households, 
enterprises and government to make 
contributions commensurate to their 
legal obligations. Secondly, sustained 
external donor financial support would 
strengthen the revenue base of the 
SHI schemes. Furthermore, sustained 
efforts would be needed to build 
new SHI-related organizations and 
reinforce administrative capacities 
to manage them. Crucially, progress 
with implementation will depend 
on political consensus and effective 
collaboration between stakeholders. 
In particular accepting a minimum 
degree of solidarity involving pooling of 
contributions and risks from all groups 
in society is a must.
Fulfilling all prerequisites may be a 
tall order, and it stands to reason that 
a transition period to a mature social 
health insurance system may last a 
decade or more. Having said all this, 
one should not forget that SHI is not 
the one and only method for reaching 
universal health coverage. Quite a 
number of possible paths exist with 
mixes of SHI, tax-based funding, 
community-based and private health 
insurance. Each country will have to 
decide what is most optimal in its own 
context. Should SHI be adopted, there 
is no doubt that implementation will be 
accompanied by various challenges of 
a political, organizational and financial 
nature. These should not discourage 
countries, however. A perfect road to 
universal health coverage does not 
exist. In fact, international experience 
shows that the development of SHI in 
the now high-income countries was 
far from smooth. In the meantime, the 
experience of countries such as Rwanda 
is noteworthy and promising.    
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Today it is widely recognized that 
serious health problems (“health 
shocks” hereafter) and lack of financial 
protection from the consequences 
of these problems are important 
determinants for poverty. This link 
is reinforced by the fact that often 
poverty itself increases the exposure to 
health shocks. There is wide empirical 
evidence that reducing the risk from 
shocks, by relaxing short term credit 
and resource constraints, is crucial 
for increasing private productivity 
and investments which in turn should 
stimulate economic growth and reduce 
poverty. With regard to health, one can 
typically see an unequal distribution of 
utilization and quality of health care in 
developing countries. It is mainly the 
poor that forgo treatment, where health 
care is mainly financed by out-of-pocket 
payments and the foremost barrier to 
access to health care is affordability. In 
case of unexpected health expenditures 
associated with health shocks, a lack 
of financial protection can lead either 
to poor households to forgo health 
treatment or to exacerbating poverty 
through catastrophic health payments. 
Hence, providing access to health 
care for the poor must be seen as one 
important driver of equitable growth 
and should be a key component of a 
social security system.
Many low and middle income countries 
have introduced social health insurance 
schemes in the past. However, usually 
they only cover employees in the public 
and private formal sector. So unless a 
significant formalization of the entire 
labour force occurs, the large majority 
of the poor usually associated with the 
non-salaried and informal sector will 
remain excluded from social health 
insurance in the future. Given the 
above mentioned poverty and growth 
implications that entails, more and more 
countries are considering experiments 
with various health insurance schemes. 
To discuss progress in that field 
and to debate the advantages and 
disadvantages of different insurance 
systems, the Institute of Social Studies 
and the SMERU research institute in 
Jakarta jointly organized a session with 
the theme “Securing access to health 
insurance for the poor” at the Annual 
Bank Conference on Development 
Economics (ABCDE) held in Cape Town 
in June 2008. 
In that session two insurance schemes 
were presented in detail. Asep 
Suyahardi, Deputy Director for Research 
at SMERU, presented the Indonesian 
Askeskin (Asuranci Kesehatan umtuk 
Keluarga Miskin), which is a public 
health insurance targeted at the poor. 
Wendy Janssens, Researcher at the Free 
University of Amsterdam presented an 
assessment of private health insurance 
schemes, organized as medical aid 
funds in Namibia and discussed the 
introduction of new low-cost private 
health insurance programs in that 
country. Discussants were Aparnaa 
Somanathan, Health Economist at 
the World Bank, Eddy van Doorslaer, 
Professor of Health Economics at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam and 
Robert Sparrow, Development 
Economist at ISS. Robert Sparrow is also 
a co-author of the paper on Indonesia’s 
Askeskin scheme. The session was 
chaired by Michael Grimm, Professor of 
Development Economics at ISS.
Although Namibia’s public health 
system benefits from - for African 
standards - high government spending 
as well as flat and highly subsidized 
user fees, the system is, as pointed 
out by Wendy Janssens, characterized 
by a substantial inequality in access 
and a generally rather low quality of 
care mainly due to long waiting times. 
Namibia has no general public health 
insurance. In the greater Windhoek 
area however, the area Wendy 
Janssens focused on, about 30% of 
the population were covered by so-
called medical aid funds in 2006, i.e. 
at the time of the survey she draws on. 
These funds are usually private with the 
exception of the government health 
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fund which insures public employees. 
Coverage, as one can expect, varies 
substantially with socio-economic status, 
employment and income. In the poorest 
income quintile only 5% of all individuals 
are insured, whereas in the richest 
income quintile almost 70% are insured. 
Individuals with unemployed household 
heads or household heads employed in 
the informal sector are the groups with 
the lowest coverage rates. 
Currently, several new low-cost 
insurance schemes aimed at lower- 
and middle income employees are 
being introduced in Namibia. The 
schemes include HIV/AIDS treatment 
and counselling in addition to basic 
primary and secondary health care. They 
are company-based with employers 
covering at least fifty percent of the 
premiums. In order to pool HIV-related 
risk across schemes and employment 
sectors, the so-called Okambilimbili 
project has set up a Risk Equalization 
Fund for HIV-related costs. The new 
schemes cover approximately 40,000 
individuals. Both programs, the medical 
aid funds and the Okambilimbili project 
are explained in more detail by Wendy 
Janssens in her contribution in this same 
issue (see page 13).
With respect to Indonesia, Asep 
Suryahadi explained that in 2004, 
around 20% of the Indonesian 
population was covered by some kind 
of health insurance, most of them 
specifically designed and targeted 
for different categories of formal 
private and public employees. The 
benefits provided by these insurance 
schemes varied greatly and they did 
not necessarily imply that the insured 
were completely free from financial 
risk if they faced catastrophic illness. 
During the 1997/98 crisis the Indonesian 
government introduced several safety 
net initiatives that have improved access 
to health care through targeted price 
subsidies with some success, such as the 
health card. However, as pointed out by 
Asep Suryahadi, these initiatives were 
also criticized for different administrative 
and targeting problems, inferior quality 
of subsidized care and high remaining 
indirect costs. Hence, similar to 
Namibia, access to appropriate health 
care is clearly lower for the poor. Asep 
Suryahadi illustrated this by looking at 
the number of outpatient and inpatient 
visits across the income distribution. 
In particular inpatient care in private 
hospitals is almost only used by the 
richest two income quintiles. Comparing 
actual expenditures among the poor 
with hypothetical expenditures they 
should have had with similar access 
to health care as the rich shows also 
substantial gaps. To compensate for 
reductions in fuel subsidies, in 2005 the 
Indonesian Government launched the 
Askeskin program under which poor 
households can receive basic outpatient 
health care and third class hospital care 
for free. Districts are responsible for 
identifying and counting the eligible 
(poor) participants. 
In February 2006, the Askeskin program 
covered about 25 million people, which 
was roughly 12% of the total Indonesian 
population. Although 70% of the people 
covered are with the poorest 40% of the 
population, almost 12% of all individuals 
covered fall into the richest 40% of the 
population. Hence, as noted by Eddy 
van Doorslaer, although the program 
did disproportionately reach the poor 
it shows a considerable leakage to the 
non-poor. Asep Suryahadi stressed 
that the Askeskin cards are in principle 
free but that prospective participants 
were asked to pay for photographs and 
these additional costs probably made 
the scheme unaffordable for many 
households in particular for those with 
many children. The discussions also 
showed that in terms of impact the 
program is not particularly pro-poor, 
because even if utilization increased 
significantly among all Askeskin 
participants, the largest increase could 
again be observed among the non-
poor, in particular for inpatient care. This 
bears in principle the risk of a “Matthew 
effect”, so explains Eddy van Doorslaer, 
where “the rich get richer and the poor 
get poorer”. Asep Suryahadi explained 
that service provision is also hindered by 
the fact that travel distance and related 
costs still remain a barrier for many poor 
households. In the coming years the 
Indonesian government wants Askeskin 
to scale up to 60 million participants. 
This would of course provide the 
opportunity to strengthen the targeting 
performance of the program. However, 
whether this objective can be met 
depends on both the criteria employed 
by district governments to identify the 
poor and also how the Government 
deals with fiscal problems and problems 
related to the compensation of 
providers and reimbursements, which 
presently challenge the program.
However, despite all these caveats 
both cases – Namibia and Indonesia - 
suggest that health insurance mitigates 
shocks and protects households from 
serious income shortfalls. In Indonesia 
the use of outpatient and inpatient 
care was significantly higher among 
participants in Askeskin than by non-
participants. In Nambia, the data 
allowed also to look at the impact 
of specific health shocks on different 
types of income and consumption for 
the insured and uninsured. These data 
were collected before the introduction 
of the new Okambilimbili-supported 
insurance schemes. The results show 
that for instance the uninsured face on 
average lower non-food consumption 
and a higher uptake of credit following 
a shock than the uninsured who do not 
experience a severe health event. They 
are also more likely to have lower assets 
which suggest that the uninsured have 
to deplete assets to overcome health 
shocks. Such effects are not found 
for households with insurance. Both 
the uninsured and the insured show 
higher unearned income after a health 
shock which suggests that they benefit 
from transfers of relatives and friends. 
Both discussants, Eddy van Doorslaer 
and Robert Sparrow, highlighted the 
methodological problems related to 
such impact evaluations if they do not 
rely on a randomized survey design. 
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Robert Sparrow put forward selection 
problems in analyzing the Namibian 
case, given that richer households 
are more likely to participate in the 
private health insurance. However, 
the upcoming second survey round in 
Namibia will be able to account for such 
selection effects. Eddy van Doorslaer 
pointed to the possibility of other 
unobserved shocks on income which 
could bias the results for Indonesia and 
suggested not only to look at absolute 
utilization levels but also at utilization 
levels given need, which is probably 
higher among the poor than the rich.
Another issue which was intensively 
discussed in Cape Town was whether 
private provision of health care for 
the poor is more efficient and socially 
optimal than public provision.  In the 
particular case of Namibia the private 
insurance schemes are mostly operating 
in urban areas, because the country 
has many remote areas and a wide 
variation in population densities and, 
hence, private provision may not be 
very low cost outside the main urban 
centres. Aparnaa Somanathan also 
emphasized that in a country with 
high income inequality like Namibia, 
public provision of services may play 
an effective role in redistributing 
resources towards the poor; in contrast, 
steering the poor towards greater use 
of private facilities, where they would 
face greater financial barriers to access 
is likely to worsen existing inequalities. 
On the other hand, as Wendy Janssens 
replied, a greater mobilization of private 
resources through private insurance 
combined with substantial employer 
contributions could relieve pressure 
from the government budget and 
allow for improvements in the quality 
of public care for the uninsured. This 
may become especially relevant as 
the evolving HIV/AIDS-epidemic in 
Namibia, at an estimated prevalence 
rate of twenty percent in 2006, will put 
increasing strain on the public health 
system.
Moreover, in the discussions it was 
emphasized that in many developing 
countries in other parts of the world, the 
market share of private insurance has 
been limited by several factors. First, 
many low/middle income countries 
have an insufficient number of high 
quality provider networks to contract 
with, and, second, countries have 
only a limited capacity for regulation, 
management and actuarial analysis, all 
of which might be critical for the success 
of private health insurance schemes. 
A number of legal and regulatory 
mechanisms are needed to foster a well-
functioning market of private insurance, 
including definitions on standards for 
market entry, rules for reporting and 
market exit, and consumer protection 
mechanisms. Third, a precondition to 
the development of private insurance 
entities is a viable financial market 
because the reserves from premiums 
collected must be invested to ensure 
profits over outlays and this profit would 
probably be critical for the sustainability 
of private insurance entities. However, 
there was agreement that all these 
concerns apply probably first of all 
to poor and very poor countries and 
less to Namibia, which has a relatively 
well developed and regulated private 
insurance market.
There was also much debate with 
regards to whether private health 
insurance is an efficient and equitable 
alternative to a public scheme for the 
pooling of risks and resources. Aparnaa 
Somanathan was sceptical because, 
according to her argument, private 
health insurance could create multiple 
risk pools based on employer group and 
other factors. This is one of the reasons 
why the new Okambilimbili project in 
Namibia has set up the Risk Equalization 
Fund to pool HIV-risk across schemes 
and groups, as Wendy Janssens 
described. Potential inefficiencies 
might also be caused by asymmetric 
information between insurers and 
health care providers and insurers 
trying to shift part of their financial 
risk to their members and providers. 
Private voluntary health insurance 
might set behavioural incentives to 
providers and members and enhance 
typical informational problems related 
to insurance contracts such as self-
selection of high risk individuals into 
insurance (adverse selection), selection 
of low-risk individuals by insurers 
(cream-skimming), avoidance of risk-
reducing behaviour by the insured 
(moral hazard) and supplier induced 
demand by care providers. The poor 
would be less likely to be covered than 
the rich by such an insurance scheme. 
However, at least for Namibia the 
medical household data suggest that 
the occurrence of risk selection and 
cream-skimming based on health status 
is very limited, but upcoming research 
will investigate these issues further. 
A last issue which came up in the 
discussions was the relationship 
between the purchasers and the 
providers of services and whether one 
system, i.e. public or private, offers 
significant advantages in that respect. 
Whereas Wendy Janssens suggested 
that the private sector might improve 
efficiency, in particular through the use 
of output-based contracts, Aparnaa 
Somanathan saw the potential in 
strategic purchasing of services where 
insurers contract on a competitive 
basis with a range of public and private 
providers. However, she admitted 
that this potential can only be used if 
certain preconditions exist. First, the 
purchaser needs adequate information 
to assess provider performance and 
has to use the results in rate-setting 
and contracting. Second, providers 
need some degree of managerial and 
financial autonomy to be able to react 
to the incentives set by the provider 
payment method. Third, consumers 
must have a choice of providers such 
that ‘the money follows the patient’. 
Without these pre-conditions, the 
systems would be subject to abuse and, 
hence, governance becomes an issue. 
At the end of their presentations both 
speakers, Asep Suryahadi and Wendy 
Janssens, pointed out that reliable and 
systematic knowledge in this area is 
still very limited. Follow-up surveys in 
Indonesia and ongoing pilot projects 
aimed at expanding subsidized private 
health insurance in Namibia and Nigeria 
will soon allow for the undertaking 
of further impact evaluation-based 
research on these questions. They will in 
particular allow investigating the extent 
to which there is adverse selection or 
cream-skimming, the impact on equity 
in access, and whether these programs 
do indeed have a positive effect on 
quality and efficiency as envisaged. 
For Indonesia, the crucial question 
will be whether the Askeskin system 
is fiscally sustainable and whether it 
improves in targeting the poor. In more 
general terms, for many very poor Sub-
Saharan African countries the challenge 
is of course first of all to create the 
institutions necessary to implement 
such insurance systems. 
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Africa today is bearing an extraordinarily large health burden as the epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and the 
opportunistic infections associated with some of these diseases put increasing demands on the healthcare sector. Health risk is one 
of the severest risks confronting poor households. Apart from the personal suffering it brings, illness can cripple a poor household’s 
income earning capacity. Sick individuals can no longer contribute to household income. On top of that, households must allocate 
resources to provide care within the family and cover the expenses of treatment. More than 150 million people globally suffer 
financial catastrophe every year due to out-of-pocket health expenditures. The surge of HIV/AIDS-related illnesses and deaths only 
exacerbates this problem. In the absence of access to free and good quality public care or health insurance, households are forced 
to resort to alternative coping strategies. However, for low-income households the depletion of savings, assets, or human capital 
may lead to a further eroding of their already poor asset base. For example, children might have to decrease their time in school 
and start working for income, care for their ill household member or take over domestic chores. In such circumstances, the benefits 
of health insurance schemes that include HIV/AIDS treatment are potentially large.
Currently, our knowledge is limited 
with respect to the impacts of private 
health insurance on health care 
utilization, health status and financial 
risk protection. In this article, we 
initiate a policy discussion around the 
potential role of private insurance to 
buffer health shocks, especially in the 
face of HIV/AIDS. We present a case 
study of Namibia where the Dutch 
organization PharmAccess has initiated 
a pilot program introducing the concept 
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of low-cost private voluntary health 
insurance products. 
The sTaTe of healTh and The 
healTh secTor in namibia 
Namibia is a lower-middle income 
country with a GNP per capita of 
US$6,960 (the African average is 
US$2,074). However, this number 
conceals the enormous differences in 
wealth within the population. In fact, 
Namibia has one of the highest levels 
of inequality in the world. The richest 
10 percent of the population receive 65 
percent of the country’s total income, 
while approximately 35 percent of the 
population live below the poverty line of 
US$ 1 a day. 
The Namibian population suffers from 
three major communicable diseases; 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
These three diseases are the first, 
second and third major causes of 
deaths in hospitals respectively (WHO 
2004). HIV/AIDS prevalence rates 
increased from 4.2% in 1992 to 19.9% 
in 2005. There was a substantial drop 
in life expectancy due to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic from 60 to 52 for males and 
from 63 to 55 for females between 1991 
2004 (WHO, WHOSIS, 2006). Currently, 
approximately half of the 45,000 
individuals in need of antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) are receiving treatment. 
In a few years, the total number of 
individuals in need of ART could be 
well above 200,000 as infected people 
increasingly develop AIDS. This will 
put a tremendous strain on the health 
sector.
Over the past two decades, there has 
been considerable improvement in 
the public health care sector. After 
independence from South Africa in 
1991, the Namibian health system was 
very fragmented. Most health facilities 
were concentrated in the urban areas 
and segregated along racial lines. Since 
then, a strong political commitment 
to upgrade the primary health care 
system has made health services 
more responsive to the needs of the 
population, albeit at a slow pace (WHO 
Country Cooperation Strategy, Republic 
of Namibia 2004-2007). 
As health is one of the government’s 
priorities, Namibia is now among 
the top tier of African countries with 
respect to health expenditures. Over 
the period 1993 to 2000, 11 percent of 
government spending was earmarked 
for health (WHO 2004). The country has 
one of the highest total expenditures 
on health as percentage of GDP - 6.8 
percent - nearly 70 percent of which are 
government expenditures (WHO, 2006). 
Not only is government health spending 
high in relative terms, but out-of-pocket 
expenditures as a proportion of private 
health expenditures are 18 percent; the 
second lowest among African countries, 
surpassed only by South Africa. These 
figures, however, camouflage the 
large inequities in access to health 
care services between rural and urban 
dwellers, and between the rich and the 
poor. Although in principal public health 
care is freely available, in practice the 
public sector suffers from long waiting 
times, absenteeism among health 
workers and other ails. 
The Namibian health insurance industry 
is relatively well developed and primarily 
organized into medical aid funds that 
are either open or closed. Closed funds 
limit membership to employees in a 
particular firm or industry: the closed 
government health fund PSEMAS is 
the largest such scheme, insuring 43 
percent of all insured individuals.  On 
average employers pay 38 percent of 
the premium, although for PSEMAS the 
employers contribution is just below 20 
percent.
In the Greater Windhoek Area, over 
thirty percent of individuals are enrolled 
in a medical aid fund. Enrollment is 
equally likely for men and for women. 
Nevertheless, enrollment levels are 
substantially higher for male-headed 
household members (37 percent) 
compared to female-headed household 
members (22 percent). In addition, there 
are large discrepancies in coverage 
across socio-economic categories. 
Only five percent of individuals in the 
poorest consumption quintile are 
enrolled in medical aid schemes, while 
70 percent of individuals in the richest 
quintile have medical aid benefits. 
Medical aid enrollment shows a similar 
pattern across education levels. In 
addition to income and education 
differences in insurance enrollment, 
there is also a differentiation by 
industry of employment.  Those most 
likely to be insured are individuals 
whose head of household works in 
government or defense.  The least 
insured industries are manufacturing, 
retail/accommodation and construction. 
Katatura Medical Centre - Windhoek, Namibia. PharmAccess Foundation
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Not surprisingly, the employed are 
more likely to be insured than the 
unemployed.
The economic consequences 
of healTh shocks 
Based on a dataset collected in Greater 
Windhoek in 2006, we estimate the 
mitigating effects of private health 
insurance on the relationship between 
health shocks and economic outcomes. 
Overall, we find no evidence that 
health shocks have severe economic 
consequences for households that 
are enrolled in a medical aid fund. 
In contrast, households without 
health insurance suffer from large 
medical expenditures after the death, 
hospitalization or problematic weight 
loss of an adult household member, 
despite the free access to public 
care. Although gifts and support from 
others help them to overcome part of 
the financial burden, findings suggest 
that they need to resort to additional 
coping strategies, such as selling assets, 
decreasing non-food consumption or 
taking up loans. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the results do 
not show substantial effects related 
to HIV-infection. As most HIV-positive 
individuals do not yet suffer from 
physical symptoms, weight-loss can be 
taken as a proxy for a more advanced 
state of AIDS. Weight loss is not only 
associated with high costs for medical 
treatment but also with substantially 
lower labor productivity and earned 
income. Remittances from others 
are significant but not sufficient to 
compensate for all consequences of the 
health shock, as the higher use of credit 
among affected households suggests. 
This finding is particularly worrisome 
in view of the high HIV prevalence 
in Namibia. Our survey, which also 
includes medical testing for HIV-
infection, shows that individuals who 
are most likely to be infected are also 
the ones least likely to have health 
insurance. As an increasing number 
of infected people without insurance 
develop AIDS over time, households’ 
coping abilities, their social support 
networks and the public health system 
will come under increasing pressure.
a poTenTial Way forWard
In an attempt to address some of 
Namibia’s health care challenges, a 
pilot project initiated by the Dutch 
organization PharmAccess in 2004 
sought to provide low-cost private 
health insurance for low-income 
workers, including HIV/AIDS treatment 
and care, using private sector insurance 
companies. With these new products, 
output-based contracts were developed 
between insurers and health care 
providers to guarantee easily accessible 
and high quality care. Health providers 
would be carefully monitored to ensure 
that quality standards were maintained. 
Payment of providers on a per-capita 
basis instead of a fee-for-service 
basis would help keep the schemes 
financially viable. The concept behind 
the so-called Okambilimbili program 
was based on the idea that the private 
sector has under-utilized resources that 
can play a significant role in scaling-up 
health care services. Employing the 
private sector also provides the ability 
to enforce strict quality standards 
using output-based contracts where 
regulatory control is weak. Moreover, 
financing health through insurance 
would be efficient because it provides 
predictable revenue streams and 
encourages investment in the health 
sector. In addition, using private 
resources (household contributions and 
employer contributions) frees up public 
funds which can be used for the poorest 
of the poor who cannot afford insurance 
and therefore cannot use anything but 
public health care. Finally, providing 
health care for the low-income but 
economically active population has 
strong economic benefits, enabling an 
increase in participant and employer 
payments of the insurance premiums, 
thereby increasing the sustainability of 
health financing. 
Because private insurance companies in 
Namibia are interested in establishing 
their own low-cost health insurance 
programs, the key feature of the 
Okambilimbili program became the 
establishment of a risk equalization fund 
(REF) for HIV-related expenditures. In 
this fund, the privately insured groups 
contribute monthly premiums to a risk 
pool with a defined set of HIV/AIDS 
treatment benefits. Thus, the insurance 
industry can share the risk related to 
the high HIV-prevalence in Namibia in 
order to keep their low-cost products 
financially sustainable. 
The emphasis of Okambilimbili is on 
selling insurance through employers, 
rather than to individual workers. Many 
employers currently face substantial 
costs due to health-related absenteeism 
and productivity loss among their 
workers. Indeed, there is a substantial 
demand from employers for the new 
low-cost insurance schemes. Of the 
twenty-five companies that were 
approached by PharmAccess to take 
part in the Okambilimbili project, 
twenty-four were keen to participate 
in the new products. Employers 
are required to contribute at least 
a 50 percent employer subsidy of 
the premiums, thereby keeping the 
products affordable to their mostly 
low- and middle-income employees. 
At present, over 40,000 people are 
benefiting from the new insurance 
products.
In conclusion, despite the relatively 
well-functioning health care system in 
Namibia, uninsured households run 
considerable economic risks from health 
shocks. Although medical expenses 
are low on average, acute illnesses 
and injuries represent a large financial 
burden for low-income households. 
This provides substantial scope for risk-
pooling through insurance. However, 
the lower quintiles are least likely to 
be insured, due mostly to the high 
premiums of traditional insurance 
schemes, making then unaffordable for 
the poor. Since 2004, the Okambilimbili 
pilot project has introduced new low-
cost, thus affordable, private health 
insurance schemes in Namibia. Two 
of the defining characteristics of the 
new schemes are that they include full 
coverage of HIV/AIDS treatment and 
care, and that they pool HIV-related 
risk to ensure financial viability of the 
schemes. The expectation is that these 
programs will 1) allow for better basic 
health care for low-income workers 
and their families; 2) protect individuals 
against health shocks including those 
related to HIV/AIDS and the potentially 
negative mitigating behaviors 
associated with shocks; 3) relieve some 
of the burden on the public health 
sector; and 4) improve productivity of 
workers (as a result of better health) and 
in the long-run, the economic growth of 
the country. Evaluations of the program 
are currently ongoing to quantify the 
impact of the insurance schemes.
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Social Security and Population 
Ageing in Sub-Saharan Africa
Mahmood Messkoub
Demographic changes that are currently underway in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) due to a decline in fertility and AIDS in high 
prevalence countries call for fresh thinking on social provisioning and social security issues. Here we provide a brief account 
of these changes and their impact and draw on the experience of other developing countries that started their demographic 
transition earlier, in order to explore policy lessons for SSA.
The current age structure in Sub-
Saharan Africa is one of the youngest 
in the world, yet fertility rates in most 
SS African countries, like elsewhere 
in the developing world, are falling 
with the result that the proportion of 
older people in the population will be 
doubled by the middle of 21st century. 
Fertility decline should be viewed as an 
opportunity by countries with a young 
age structure. However, it is important 
to note that because of earlier episodes 
of high fertility, the working age 
population will be growing in Africa 
over the next 30-40 years, whilst the size 
of school age population will decline. 
This provides a golden opportunity 
for improving the quality of education 
and the labour force, thus increasing 
the resource base needed to manage 
the rise in the dependency ratio (old/
working age) and to care for an elderly 
population. 
On the negative side, these trends 
are compounded by the epidemic rise 
of HIV/AIDS in parts of SSA. This has 
resulted in high death rates and lower 
life expectancy, especially among those 
in the most productive age groups of 
20 – 65. Notwithstanding the human 
tragedies of AIDS, it is the impact 
on the productive capabilities in SSA 
that is of concern. The loss of such 
a large section of the labour force is 
undoubtedly going to affect labour-
intensive sectors of the economy, in 
particular small scale farming. Whilst 
high unemployment and a youthful age 
structure would in part compensate 
for the loss of unskilled labour, skilled 
labour takes longer to replace. 
The other effect of the AIDS/HIV 
epidemic is on the availability of care 
within the household and family for 
both children and the elderly. The 
traditional care givers - women - are as 
equally affected as men by HIV/AIDS 
in SSA. The loss of these carers could 
increase the risk of malnutrition and 
infectious diseases among children. The 
elderly would not only lose an important 
source of support for their own needs, 
but would also have to take on the role 
of care givers for the orphans in their 
household (UN, 1995).
Strategies designed to ensure 
the entitlement of the elderly to a 
reasonable standard of living are not 
fundamentally different from those 
designed for other dependent sections 
of the population. The key policy issue 
is not only how to tackle the welfare 
needs of the present elderly generation, 
but how to help the future generation 
of the elderly, who are potentially more 
numerous, to maintain their standard of 
living. 
The elderly are a differentiated 
population in terms of their ownership 
of assets and sources of income that 
in turn determine their entitlement 
to goods and services. The elderly’s 
income can be based on any 
combination of ownership of assets: 
own work, social security, pensions, 
marital status, other family members, 
etc. Available data on their sources of 
income in developed and developing 
countries show, that in general the 
richer the country the higher the 
percentage of those above the age of 
60 relying on pensions/welfare for their 
livelihood. In low income countries, 
except in urban areas of China, family 
and own work are the main sources of 
income. The data also suggests that as 
countries get richer, formal systems gain 
importance in providing support to the 
elderly. 
Family is a much more important source 
of income for the elderly in Africa than 
elsewhere in the developing world. In 
Africa the informal systems are based 
on broader familial links than in Asia. 
The extended family could contain adult 
brothers and sisters as well as children. 
Reliance on the younger generation is 
not limited to one’s own blood children: 
the practice of adoption, fosterage, 
raising grandchildren, all help to widen 
the support base. Another source 
of informal support in Africa is the 
existence of kin, community and tribal 
support (World Bank, 1994). Migration 
has also played a complicated role in 
the development and maintenance 
of informal systems: it provids extra 
cash income that alleviates poverty, 
allowing the household to support its 
non-migrating members, including 
the elderly. This is predicated on the 
maintenance of links between the 
migrating members and the family, 
thus allowing the migrating members 
to come ‘home’ on retirement to be 
cared for by their family and the larger 
community. Such links are easier to 
maintain under circular patterns of 
migration, which are common in parts 
of SSA.
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Informal systems, however, are 
not without costs, not all of them 
monetized, and not necessarily spread 
equally across household members. 
Women bear the main burden of caring 
for the elderly. At times, health costs 
could be prohibitive and undermine the 
resource base of the family by forcing 
the sale of valuable assets. In some 
households the demographic balance 
could also shift heavily against the 
younger generation, putting the care 
of a rising number of elderly beyond 
the their financial and physical capacity. 
The latter point is particularly important 
in SSA where AIDS is affecting those 
of working age. The table is turned on 
the elderly who now have to care for 
their dying children and look after their 
grandchildren. 
As far as any formal old age care and 
social security system is concerned, the 
first objective is to protect or to provide 
aged people with the entitlement 
to a basic standard of living in line 
with their lifetime experience and the 
expectations of the society concerned. 
The second objective is to reduce 
the gap between different sections of 
the elderly. While the first objective 
can be achieved under a variety of 
institutional arrangements, the second 
objective requires some degree of state 
intervention. 
Currently, the main pension schemes 
in the great majority of SSA countries 
are earnings related and cover 
formal sector employees who are 
predominantly urban based. Botswana 
is the only country with a universal 
pension scheme, while South Africa 
operates a means tested scheme. A 
few other countries operate a means 
tested scheme alongside their earning 
related schemes. Several countries also 
operate a Provident Funds scheme (a 
compulsory savings plan) that provides 
a lump sum on retirement or modest 
pensions and other contingencies, 
depending on its governing rules and 
regulations (ISSA, 2005). 
Considering the limited population 
coverage of most of these schemes, 
they should be complemented with a 
range of policies that address the needs 
of the growing elderly population. In 
this respect there are valuable lessons 
to be learnt from the experience of 
East Asian countries that, like those 
in SSA, had relied on their traditional 
family structure for old age care. This 
was complemented by a range of 
policies that provided support for the 
family extended the coverage of formal 
schemes.
An obvious starting point in many of the 
E. Asian countries was the identification 
of the elderly’s needs. Prioritising 
needs allowed the state to meet these 
selectively and within its budgetary 
capacity. In general, support is means 
tested in E. Asia and targeted towards 
the poor. All include some basic health 
and income maintenance support that 
work as a safety net to cover those who 
are most in need among the elderly. 
In addition, formal sector and state 
employees are entitled to a secure 
contribution-related pension. 
Drawing on these similarities, the issue 
of ageing in SSA could be addressed 
at various levels. At macro level, and 
following Singapore’s model, the 
ageing should be given a permanent 
and prominent presence at national 
level policy making fora. This process 
could begin by setting up an inter-
departmental committee whose 
members would be drawn from, for 
example health, social security and 
welfare ministries, and voluntary 
organisations. Open and democratic 
debate is essential for the formulation 
of correct and legitimate policies. The 
legitimation issue is important for the 
public’s acceptance and implementation 
Esther aged 75 from Nakawa Division in Uganda. She supports a family of six grandchildren.  
Ddungu Racheal Mugabi
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of policies and for maximising donor’s 
assistance. 
Another important feature of E. Asia is 
its macroeconomic and price stabilities. 
Before the economic crisis of late 1990s, 
E. Asia had enjoyed long periods with 
a stable macroeconomic environment 
with low inflation that maintained 
the purchasing power of the elderly’s 
income. Whilst macroeconomic stability 
is a general policy goal, more specific 
policies like indexation of the elderly’s 
income to the consumer price index 
has to be enacted in order to assure 
people who are making plans for their 
retirement in 20 to 30 years time that the 
value of their savings will be protected. 
Moving on to the informal and the 
household support system, as far as the 
family source of income is concerned, 
there are no hard and fast rules, except 
the general principle of supporting the 
economic base of the informal system 
of care for the elderly. At macro level 
this means supporting the agricultural 
sector: in general, the rural economy 
is important in SSA as it is where the 
majority of the elderly live. Another 
area of intervention is communication 
between rural and urban areas. The 
rural to urban migration of younger 
people could weaken the link between 
the two generations within families, 
and increase the level of uncertainty 
for the elderly who rely on remittances. 
Improving the flow of information and 
communication between the two areas 
and offering incentives for remittances 
could help to maintain the economic 
and social links between the two areas 
and between generations. Maintaining 
and encouraging generational solidarity 
is not without its costs, especially 
for the poor young households who 
have to and will share their meager 
resources with their elders. Some young 
households may not be able to save 
and accumulate resources essential for 
investment to raise their productivity. 
That is why public action and state 
support is essential to complement 
household support.   
States in E. Asia provide a range of 
services such as health insurance, 
medical tests, pensions, income 
support and tax relief that in general 
complement rather than substitute 
those provided by families and other 
institutions. Some of these services, 
like pensions, take longer to set up or 
extend their coverage in SSA, whilst 
others could be implemented quickly, 
such as tax relief to families caring 
for their elderly, and health support. 
Complementarities between formal and 
informal systems in the era of cutbacks 
in state welfare budgets means that 
any cuts should ensure that the income 
of families caring for the elderly is 
protected when it comes to charging of 
fees and cuts in public services. 
In South Korea and Singapore work 
has been used as another measure to 
maintain the economic independence of 
the elderly and to alleviate the pressure 
on labour supply shortages. S. Korea 
established job placement schemes for 
retirees and the elderly. For example, 
the elderly have been helped to set up 
workshops and share the income, or 
have been given priority for setting up 
stalls in public places such as parks to 
sell basic necessities and government 
monopoly goods. This policy can easily 
be adopted in SSA. To ensure that the 
benefits of such preferential treatment 
would not go only to those who have 
the skills and the capital to set up a 
small business however, this policy has 
to be complemented with the provision 
of small loans and training. Micro-credit 
institutions could help in this regard, 
and could also be used to build up 
pension funds for the poorer sections of 
the population. The potential downside 
of supporting the elderly to set up small 
businesses – competition with existing 
businesses in the informal sector – 
should not be of major concern given 
the relatively small number of elderly 
involved. 
Africa has a rich history of looking 
after its older generation. In designing 
policies, due attention should be 
given to the existing institutional 
arrangements, both informal and 
formal, by trying to increase the 
complementarities between the two. 
The cost of running pay-as-you-go 
pension schemes would be lowered if 
household-based arrangements for the 
care of the elderly could be maintained. 
Providing financial incentives to 
households to care for their elderly 
should be part of the planning for 
population ageing. Strengthening the 
financial and other infrastructural links 
between rural and urban areas should 
also help migrating members of the 
household to look after the rural-based 
older generation. 
The establishment and reform of 
the formal system is a much more 
problematic policy area. The existing 
pension schemes have a very limited 
coverage in SSA and in the main are 
restricted to wage earners. Expanding 
their coverage may be beyond the 
financial capacity of many African 
governments. Establishing private 
pension schemes, fashionable as 
it is, requires a strong regulatory 
infrastructure of the financial sector. 
As a first step, such regulatory 
frameworks have to be put in place, 
while developing and strengthening the 
financial sector. 
Within the formal financial sector, 
provident funds have offered a certain 
degree of support to the elderly. 
Converting them into pension funds 
could come at the expense of the 
contingency function of these funds 
for the contributors. If people have to 
increase their savings for contingencies, 
their ability to contribute to a pension 
fund may well be eroded. The reform of 
provident funds has to take account of 
the various functions of these funds by 
trying to establish different instruments 
for the main functions - pension funds, 
micro-savings/credit funds, grant based 
means tested financial support, etc.
Social policies have to take account 
of the heterogeneity of the elderly in 
terms of their social and economic 
background and their areas of residence 
(rural or urban). Formal pension 
schemes more often than not cater for 
the urban based middle and upper 
strata of the population. The rest are 
too poor to meet the requirements of 
the formal sector. The formal financial 
sector in most developing countries 
has not in general been a source of 
financial service and assistance to the 
poor. Development of micro-financial 
organisations with the aim of providing 
financial support to the elderly should 
be an integral part of government 
planning for old age. Finally, a more 
general approach to the care of the 
elderly has to be established in which 
the needs of the aged are integrated 
within the support provided for the 
community which is expected to care for 
them. 
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The global financial crisis of autumn 
2008 may turn into a disaster for the 
poor if we do not understand the 
signs of the times and translate them 
politically. The crisis started out as a 
financial one, due to a combination 
of US government deregulation with 
artificially low interest rates, leading 
ultimately to what we now know as 
the loss of interbank confidence due 
to sub-prime mortgage defaults. In 
hindsight, the crisis was inevitable, and 
international bankers are responsible 
for having traded polluted or poisonous 
products. They were free to trade such 
products because nobody was there to 
control them; some of them may not 
even have known how poisoned their 
products were.
This crisis reminds many observers of 
a previous one in the 1930’s. It was the 
crisis that led to mass unemployment 
in the countries concerned, to a lack of 
trust in the State and in some cases to 
fascist governments, and ultimately to 
the horrors of the Second World War. 
It also led to an intellectual reaction 
which shaped post-war social science 
thinking. In fact, the very creation of 
the Institute of Social Studies can be 
seen in this light. The reaction against 
disciplines which had not envisaged 
the consequences of the crisis led to a 
multidisciplinary approach. The horrors 
of mass unemployment led to Keynesian 
economics; the horrors of the Shoa 
led to social-psychology’s fascination 
with the Authoritarian Personality; the 
horrors of poverty led to the need for 
the State to take its responsibility, as 
people like Tinbergen argued.
The present crisis may have the same 
effects on the poor if we do not read 
the signs of the times. Again, States are 
forced to reduce the effects of a crisis 
in the capitalist world system to the 
tune of  trillions of dollars. Again, social 
science disciplines may be criticised 
for not warning in time. Again this 
may lead to populist anti-democratic 
movements leading to mass migrations 
or even genocide. The prevailing  Neo-
Liberal consensus espoused by leading 
politicians, academics and business 
leaders may be intellectually broke, it 
has nevertheless shaped many of the 
institutions that are presently asked to 
pick up the pieces left by the crisis.
Yet there are alternatives. Academics, 
grass-root intellectuals, civic leaders and 
social entrepreneurs have worked over 
the past year with ISS scholars Biekart 
and Fowler on a programme called 
Civic Driven Change. This autumn they 
edited a book by that title, subtitled 
Citizen’s Imagination in Action. Together 
with authors from Bolivia, Brazil, Finland, 
Hungary, India, Kenya, South Africa, the 
UK and the US they built “a perspective 
of change in societies that stems from 
citizens rather than states or markets.” 
They go beyond the cosy arrangement 
that NGOs created for themselves 
under the Neo-Liberal consensus, 
taking over public functions from the 
State in social and other sectors. The 
real question now becomes: how can 
citizens exercise their civic and other 
rights through responsible agency? 
Under the Neo-Liberal Consensus it was 
considered self-evident that the State 
could not control global finance. The 
amounts of the exchanges were simply 
too large; the speed with which global 
capital transfers were made, simply 
too great; the expertise to control such 
capital simply too complex to assume 
that governments could muster it. When 
US Secretary Paulson prepared his 
US$700 billion package he disproved 
the Neo-Liberal Consensus. Nicolas 
Sarkozy and Gordon Brown confirmed 
it when the stock-exchanges responded 
positively to their State interventions. 
Yet where is the citizen’s response to 
the crisis? Is it limited to pensioners’ 
grudges that their promised income 
is reduced by one third or more? Is 
it limited to the small share-holder’s 
anguish to have seen the value of her 
assets cut by half or more? Is it limited 
to the tax-payer’s concern in rich 
countries worrying about the future tax 
burden? 
Maybe all of these, plus a global civic 
driven change for greater control over 
financial flows within and between 
countries. For we did learn one lesson 
from the previous crisis: the poor are the 
first to bear the brunt if the State is not 
there to secure their rights.
Remember Tobin? Now is the time for a 
global movement to sustain an adapted 
version of his tax.
Remember Tobin?
Finance  driven cr i s i s  & Civic  dr iven response
Louk Box
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Since the Asian crisis in 1997 I have 
been teaching about financial crises. My 
examples were developing countries 
like Mexico, Thailand, and Argentina. 
In my next course I will have to shift my 
focus as today arguably the biggest 
financial crisis ever is unfolding in the 
USA and Europe. The amounts involved 
are mind-boggling and governments 
are intervening in ways that, till recently, 
were unthinkable. This short article aims 
to give a brief explanation of the crisis 
and provide a first sketch of possible 
implications for developing countries.
The crisis started in the summer of 
2007 when problems with sub-prime 
mortgages emerged in the USA. The 
very existence of sub-prime mortgages 
can tell us something about the 
financial system. Why were mortgages 
given to people with low and unstable 
incomes and weak credit histories? 
Two reasons may be suggested. The 
first is that credit was abundant and 
cheap and banks were eager for 
income earning opportunities. The 
ample credit supply was the result of 
loose monetary policies, e.g. in the 
USA and Japan. The low interest rates 
stimulated expenditure, resulting in 
very large current account deficits in 
the USA; these deficits were financed 
by the surplus savings of China and the 
oil states. The second reason relates to 
risk management. Sub-prime mortgages 
are risky as the probability of default 
is higher than on standard loans but 
investors could manage these risks 
through the use of derivatives. The 
sub-prime mortgages were packaged 
in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
‘tiered’ into risk slices. The holders 
of the most risky tier would feel the 
pain immediately when the underlying 
mortgages started to default but the 
holders of the upper tiers would only be 
affected in the unlikely event that the 
majority of sub-prime mortgages would 
default.  Credit rating agencies gave 
these upper tiers triple-A ratings which 
made them attractive for institutional 
investors. The lower tiers were bought 
by investors able and willing to run more 
risk. Another derivate instrument used 
to manage risk is the Credit Default 
Swap (CDS), a type of insurance policy 
in which the seller of the CDS will 
compensate the buyer if the value of the 
underlying asset (e.g. MBS) declines. 
The MBS and CDS are only two forms of 
derivatives traded on financial markets, 
many more products exist. The total 
amount of derivatives outstanding at 
the end of 2007 was 596 trillion USD, up 
from 95 trillion at the end of 2000. To 
give some perspective: the 596 trillion 
is about nine times the global GDP. 
From these numbers it is clear that 
the derivative market is not driven by 
the needs of the real economy, rather 
it has become a market for financial 
speculation.
Through such instruments, it was 
believed, risk could be managed. 
However, once the crisis started it 
turned out they did not work as well 
as expected. As mortgages started to 
default, the value of the MBS declined 
and the financial institutions that 
held these securities or had sold CDS 
against them started to incur losses. 
The losses suffered by these institutions 
undermined market confidence in them 
and they started to find it difficult to do 
deals on the financial markets. The loss 
of confidence was reinforced by the 
slowdown in the real economy. In 2008 
analysts started to predict a recession 
in the USA, Japan and Europe. It is 
tempting to conclude that the derivative 
products have become so complex 
that few understand the risks they 
contain. This ignorance and uncertainty 
becomes deadly when markets turn and 
confidence falls: at that stage, trade 
in these products stops and financial 
markets stop to function.
In September/October 2008 things 
came to a head: banks and mortgage 
institutions collapsed or were taken 
over or nationalized. The weekend 
of 11/12 October saw frantic political 
activity. In Washington the G-7 met, 
followed by meetings of the IMF and 
the World Bank and a meeting of 
euro leaders in Paris. The message 
coming out of these meetings was loud 
and clear: governments of advanced 
countries would do whatever necessary 
to stabilize the financial system. In 
the USA, Congress has allocated 
USD 700 billion for the Troubled 
Asset Relief programme (TARP). The 
European solution aims at a more direct 
strengthening of banks’ balance sheets 
through the infusion of new capital. 
Very importantly, governments give 
a guarantee for interbank loans in an 
The financial crisis and 
developing countries
Karel Jansen
Indian investor watches share prices on a digital stock ticker outside The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
building in Mumbai on October 8, 2008. ANP
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he has left per 1 October.
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attempt to get financial markets working 
again.
At the time of writing (October 2008) 
the crisis is unfolding and its impact 
is difficult to predict. The cost of 
restoring the financial system will be 
considerable and this will have effects 
on the real economy as well through 
the loss of wealth, the higher cost of 
borrowing and through fiscal stress. The 
economies of the advanced countries 
are thus likely to go through a difficult 
period.
The impact on developing countries 
will be varied. The direct financial 
impact may be limited. Banks in 
developing countries do not have 
large holdings of troubled assets. But 
banks, and corporations, will find it 
more difficult and more costly to borrow 
on international markets. This could 
affect particularly developing countries 
that need to finance current account 
deficits. Those countries that are more 
integrated into global trade will feel the 
strongest effects as the recession in the 
rich countries will reduce demand for 
imports and is likely to result in falling 
commodity prices. The recession in 
the West and the decline in oil prices 
will reduce workers’ remittances. Stock 
markets around the developing world 
have collapsed as foreign investors 
withdrew funds, needing all the money 
they could find to shore up their 
balance sheets at home. It is not unlikely 
that the fiscal pressures caused by the 
financial rescue operations of Western 
governments will reduce aid flows. 
The higher cost of credit, the decline in 
export earnings and weak stock markets 
are likely to affect the confidence of 
investors, both domestic and foreign.
There is thus enough reason to expect 
that the short and medium term impact 
on developing countries will be a 
slowdown of growth. The extent of 
the slowdown depends on how deep 
the recession in the rich countries 
is going to be and on how quickly 
financial markets can return to normal 
operations. Those developing countries 
that have current account surpluses and 
large stocks of international reserves 
can stimulate domestic demand to 
compensate for the fall in exports; 
for instance, a sharp increase in 
consumption in China could provide 
a welcome stimulus to the global 
economy.
The recession will be temporary. In 
the longer run the implications of the 
crisis are complex. Many expect that 
the financial system that will emerge 
from the crisis will be simpler and more 
regulated. Derivatives will remain as 
they are useful instruments to manage 
risk, but the experience of the crisis 
will cut the excess and government 
regulation is likely to increase the 
capital requirements for banks holding 
the derivatives (which will reduce their 
profitability). Governments that have 
invested in salvaging the financial 
system will take their pound of flesh 
in the form of tighter regulation and 
supervision. We will thus go back 
to a system of simpler and more 
straightforward financial intermediation. 
If this prediction were to materialize, 
developing countries may well benefit. 
Western investors in search for returns 
may recognize that investments in 
developing countries offer good 
opportunities for return and risk 
diversification.
It is also interesting to speculate about 
the political economy aspects of the 
crisis. Many are already arguing that the 
crisis spells the end of the dominance 
of the neo-liberal paradigm. The 
Washington Consensus is dead: state 
ownership and state regulation are 
back with a vengeance. I am not so 
certain: financial capital has suffered 
a severe blow and is likely to be a less 
effective promoter of liberalization, 
but multinational capital is still there 
and remains a powerful force for free 
markets.
Others see in the crisis the end of 
US hegemony. The unilateralism of 
the Bush administration had already 
undermined the US position in the 
world and the financial crisis weakens 
an essential pillar of US power. The 
USA is already running large fiscal and 
current account deficits and the financial 
rescue plan will have to be financed by 
borrowing from China and the oil states. 
It is, however, possible that China will 
experience a fall in exports and foreign 
investment so that the surplus declines 
and the falling oil prices will cut the 
surpluses of the oil states. Can they 
continue to finance the USA? Moreover, 
these countries already hold substantial 
dollar assets through their international 
reserves and through their sovereign 
wealth funds. It is likely that they have 
suffered losses on some of these 
assets. How eager will they be to get 
into more dollar assets? And will these 
creditors sullenly provide the required 
cash or will there be economic and 
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